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Abstract—We consider a setting where a system has to interact,
and hence create distinct outputs (observables), but subject
to such operational constraints wants to minimize the leakage
that such observables reveal about its secret input. It has been
previously demonstrated that under some (highly symmetrical)
constraints on the observables, it is possible to design systems
that are universally optimal in the sense of leaking minimal
information no matter how information is measured.
In this work we make several contribution to this field. On
universal (i.e., measure-invariant) optimality, we show its limita-
tions through a counterexample where symmetry constraints are
broken. Nevertheless, we also show two new universal optimality
results: the first is in the presence of “graph like” constraints
(that may lack symmetry). The second is universal optimality
in the case of uncertainty about the prior. Furthermore, we
prove that a generic class of leakage optimisation problems are
convex problem, from which we derive that KKT conditions
are necessary and sufficient for optimality. We demonstrate the
practical value of the theory in the form of an application to
timing attacks countermeasures.
I. INTRODUCTION
A common setting where privacy, anonymity, confidential-
ity, or secrecy is concerned, can be abstracted as a system
that has an internal secret and produces publicly observable
outputs. The realization of the secret is only known by the
system and the secrecy goal is to leak the least information
about the secret to potentially adversarial observers. One trivial
way to achieve “zero-leakage” is to always exhibit the same
observable irrespective of the realization of the secret. What
makes the problem non-trivial is the fact that this trivial
solution is indeed operationally unacceptable.
In secret communications, for instance, the goal is to
transfer information to intended recipients. But producing the
same observable, although guaranteeing zero leakage, will
clearly mean no information transfer either. In the classical
work of Shannon on secrecy [1], he proved that the only way
to ensure zero leakage and have secret communication is to
use “one-time-pads (OTP)” with the length at least as long as
the secret, which guarantees the observables are completely
independent from the secret to any observer other than the
intended recipients, which hold the same copy of the OTP.
However, in many contexts other than secret communi-
cation where secrecy is a desirable goal, the trivial solu-
tion of producing the same observable for all secrets may
be unsuitable or even infeasible. Consider, for instance, the
system of a password-checker, where the password as the
secret: at the bare minimum, the system should produce two
distinct observables (match/mismatch) to preserve its defining
functionality. There are some other cases where zero leakage
may be possible but undesirable as it leads to a unacceptable
degradation in the utility of the system. Some prominent
examples are:
• Defence against timing side-channel channel: Adversaries
can gain information about the system by observing the time
it takes a system to execute each process. Specially in the
context of cryptography, these fluctuations in computation
times can leak information about the secret key (an example
of side channel attack) [2], [3]. One approach to remove
this leakage is to release each of the computations only
after a constant duration. This will guarantee zero leakage
through the computation time side channel, as there will
be only one observation irrespective of the secret. However,
this may introduce huge delays as the computation time of
each process is tied to the worst case scenario.
• Defence against web-traffic fingerprinting: Similar to buck-
eting, researchers have shown that adversaries can classify
the type of encrypted web-traffic only by investigating the
attributes of their traffic, most notably, the inter-packet-
delays, as different types of web-traffic produce different
“burstiness” patterns [4], [5]. Again, a solution can be
devised that generates a single type of traffic, by a com-
bination of delaying packets and releasing them only at
certain intervals, and by generating dummy packets between
moments of silence. Clearly, this zero-leakage remedy can
lead to unacceptable overheads in delay and/or bandwidth.
• Defence against device fingerprinting: Similarly, an ad-
versary can gain information about the device/OS/Browser
through observing the structure of the request messages that
they send to a web server [6]. Here, too, the zero-leakage
solution may be undesirable/impossible to implement, as
each browser uses different message headers or plug-ins for
important purposes, especially “debuggability”.
• Location Privacy: Mobile users can take advantage of many
“location-based-services”. The zero-leakage solution means
that none of these utilities can be used, which could be an
unacceptable level of degradation [7]–[9].
In each of these settings, lowering “information leaking”
about the secret while respecting the operational constraints
and overheads of the system is of interest. We develop a
unifying framework by sufficiently abstracting the underlying
setting that capture the common theme of constrained secrecy.
In particular, in all of these settings we can consider a sys-
tem that, affected by an internal secret, generates observable
outputs. Considering the secret and the observable as random
variables, the system can be modelled as a “channel”, which is,
a conditional distribution across observables given the secret.
That is, given the realization of the secret, the system (poten-
tially probabilistically) produces a particular observable. This
is an equivalent interpretation of the system as a “strategy”,
that is, a recipe of (potentially randomized) action per each
secret. Throughout the paper, we will use “channels” and
“strategies” interchangeably.
The problem then becomes the following: design a channel
(strategy) such that: (1) it has minimal leakage, (2) none of
the secrets are assigned to an unacceptable observable (“hard
constraints”); (3) the “average” quality of performance of the
system does not degrade too much (soft constraints);
But how should we quantify leakage to be able to compare
among designs/channels/strategies? Leakage of information
for channels has been studied by researchers in quantitative
information flow [3], [10]–[15]. A candidate for measuring the
amount of leakage was the difference between the posterior
and prior Shannon entropies, however, it was shown that
Shannon entropy may not be a good representative of the
situation for some contexts. For instance, in password guessing
attacks, more than the Shannon entropy, which relates to an
adversary that can ask set-membership questions, the relevant
measure of entropy is “Guesswork”, which is related to the
expected number of guesses before striking on the correct one.
This raises a question of which entropy function to choose,
given that they have different operational interpretation some
of which depends on modelling the adversary. A recent work
[16] showed that in a special case, one can design channels
that are optimal no matter what measure of leakage is chosen
and hence are in that sense “robust” against what adversary
model the measure reflects.
In this work we explore this concept of universality, show
the limitations of the previous results, establish universal
properties and discuss a potential application.
Road-map and Contributions: The paper starts (Section
II) by introducing the technical background relevant to this
work. We will then prove (Section III) a fundamental result
showing that the general problem of Leakage-Minimal Design
is a convex optimization problem; we also show that the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient
for solving these convex optimizations.
Section IV is about universality. We first show a nega-
tive result: that in general, universality breaks down when
constraints other than size are added. We can interpret this
result as suggesting that universality requires a high degree of
symmetry. We then show a positive result about the existence
of universally optimal channels for “graph-like” cloaking
constraints where “symmetry” may be absent.
We will then explore (Section V) the case when the attacker
has uncertainty about the prior, in the sense that he knows
that the prior distribution can be one of a (finite) number
of possible distributions on the secret. We show that in this
case the problem can be simplified by assuming an “averaged
prior”. In particular, universal optimality can be achievable if
the constraint is either per the setting in Section IV or the
setting in [16]. In particular, all of the previous results hold
just by considering a single “averaged prior”.
Finally, in Section VI, we will show an application of these
ideas to countermeasures of timing attacks by introducing and
analysing “randomized bucketing” strategies.
Related Literature: This paper builds on [16] and makes
several important non incremental advances on that work as
described in the contributions, both in terms of extending
universality results, showing limitations of universality and
demonstrating applications of the theory.
More generally this work contributes to the foundations
of quantitative security and its results are relevant to most
approaches to Quantitative Information Flow, both the ones
using Shannon (e.g. [12]), Min Entropy (e.g. [15]), Bayes risk
[17] and more recent work using g-leakage [10], [18] and
unconditional security [19]. Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions
for Shannon leakage analysis were used in [20], [21] in a
more restricted setting than the one studied here.
II. GENERAL MODEL
Let S represent the secret as a random variable. It can
take one of the |S| possibilities from the (finite discrete) set
of S := {s1, . . . , s|S|} with the (categorical) distribution of
P S ∈ ∆(S). That is, P S ∈ {(ps), s ∈ S | ps ≥ 0 ∀s ∈
S,
∑
s∈S ps = 1}. Without loss of generality, we assume that
every secret has a strictly positive probability of realization,
i.e., supp(P S) = S.1
We make the worst-case assumption about the adversaries:
that they know the true probability distribution of the secret.
That is, we take P S to be publicly known, hence we will
simply refer to P S as the prior. The defender, observing the
(realization of the) secret, produces an observable o ∈ O.
Let Ω ⊆ S×O define the permissible observables per each
secret. Specifically, if (s, o) 6∈ Ω, then for secret s, the defender
cannot produce observable o. A deterministic channel, denoted
by d, is a mapping from secrets to observables, such that each
assignment is permissible. Hence, the set of all deterministic
channels is: {d : S → O | ∀s : (s, d(s)) ∈ Ω}.
A probabilistic channel, which we denote by δ, allows
randomization over permissible observables per each secret.
Specifically, the space of probabilistic channels is {δ : S →
∆(O) | ∀s ∈ S, ∀o ∈ supp(δ(s)) : (s, o) ∈ Ω}. Clearly,
any deterministic channel can be represented as a probabilistic
channel as well, with degenerate distributions. For the rest of
the paper, unless explicitly stated, by “channel” we mean a
probabilistic channel.
We use the familiar notation of conditional probability,
i.e., δ(o|s), to designate the probability at which channel δ
1Support of a probability distribution is defined as the set of all possible
values that has a strictly positive probability of realization.
produces observable o when the secret is s. Using this notation,
the space of channels is specified by the following conditions:
δ(o|s) ≥ 0 ∀(s, o) ∈ S ×O (1a)∑
o∈O δ(o|s) = 1 ∀s ∈ S (1b)
δ(o|s) = 0 ∀(s, o) 6∈ Ω. (1c)
Conditions (1b) and (1b) just impose that the channel should
be a legitimate conditional distribution. We will refer to (1c)
as “hard” constraints, as they strictly forbid some secret-
observable pairs “path-wise”, that is, per each realization of
the secret. As a consequence, an adversary can eliminate the
forbidden secrets for an observable when making an inference.
The naming is to contrast with the “soft” constraint discussed
later, which is expressed in terms of an expected value.
The aim is designing channels within the above boundaries
that are “leakage-optimal”. That is, finding a feasible condi-
tional distribution δ(o|s) that, in a quantifiable way, leaks the
least information about the secret to an adversary, who is aware
of both the distribution of the secret and our channel design.
At a high level, the information “leakage” can be quan-
tified as the difference between the “prior uncertainty” of
an adversary and its “posterior uncertainty”, on average. The
expected uncertainty is quantified by an entropy measure. We
will denote the entropy of a random variable S with probability
distribution P by H(S) = H(P ), where H is a function from
probability distributions to real numbers.
Intricately, there are many different candidates for the choice
of the entropy, each with a distinct “operational” significance.
For instance, the 1-guess-error-probability is computed as
H(P ) = 1 − ‖P ‖∞, where ‖P ‖∞ denotes the ∞-norm
of P , that is ‖P ‖∞ = p[1] = maxi(p1, . . . , pn). Notably,
1−‖P ‖∞ is the probability that the best guess of an adversary
about the secret is incorrect. A closely related measure is Min-
entropy: H(P ) = − log ‖P ‖∞. The l-guess-error-probability
extends to the cases where an adversary can submit l best
guesses. Specifically, H(P ) = 1−
∑l
i=1 p[i] is the probability
that none of these guesses would be correct, where p[i]
denotes the ith largest element of P , breaking ties arbitrarily.
Another frequently used entropy with a clear interpretation
is guesswork (guessing) entropy: H(P ) =
∑n
i=1 ip[i]. This
represents the minimum expected number of steps that takes
a sequentially guessing adversary to get to the secret. Prob-
ably the most well-known entropy is the (Gibbs)-Shannon’s:
H(P ) = −
∑n
i=1 pi log(pi), pertaining to the shortest coding
of the secret, which can also be interpreted as the least
expected number of “subset-membership” questions of an
adversary before getting to the secret. A family of entropies is







i ), or equivalently, Hα(P ) =
α
1−α log ‖P ‖α, where ‖ · ‖α denotes the α-norm. Rényi en-
tropies can recover Shannon and Min-entropy as limit cases
by respectively letting α→ 1 and α→∞. The case of α = 2,




i is called the Collision entropy.
Likewise, α = 0 case, i.e., H0(P ) = log | supp(P )| = log n
is known as the Hartley entropy.
The uncertainty of the adversary after observing the output
of the channel (on average) is measured by posterior entropy
or “equivocation”, which we denote by H[S|O]. For each
of the aforementioned entropies, a posterior entropy can be
defined in a meaningful way. For instance, the posterior 1-
guess-error-entropy can be simply defined as the average
failure rate of an adversary that makes a best guess about
the secret after seeing the observable. For a formal repre-
sentation, first let us define O+ to be the set of observ-
ables that have a strictly positive probability of realization
(given a channel δ). Note that, since supp(P S) = S, we
simply have: O+ = ∪s∈S supp(δ(s)). Using this notation,
we can write the following relation for the posterior en-





. Similarly, with respect to guess-














s∈S p(s|o) log (p(s|o))
]
. For the Rényi
family, there are at least two different relations for the posterior

















As in the spirit of [16], we consider a generic conditional
entropy that encompass all of the aforementioned entropies.
In particular, it has the following structure:








where η : R→ R function, and F is a bounded scalar function
on probability distributions with the following properties:
• symmetry, i.e., its value only depends on the shape of
a probability distribution and does not change with any
re-labelling of the probabilities;
• expansibility, i.e., its value does not change by padding
the probability distribution with zero entries; and
• non-decreasing in each element;
Moreover, one of the following two situations holds:2
η: increasing, and F : concave; or (4a)
η: decreasing, and F : convex. (4b)
Note that the form of the conditional entropy in (3) governs
the form of the unconditional entropy as well (e.g. by taking O
and S to be independent). Specifically, H[S] = η (F (P )). For
the rest of the paper, unless explicitly clarified, by “entropy”
we mean any member of the generic class described above.
Next, we show how this structure can encompass all of
the previous entropies as special cases. For instance, Shannon
2F (P ) is concave (resp. convex) in P iff: ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], P 1,P 2 ∈ ∆S,
we have: λF (P 1) + (1− λ)F (P 2) ≤ (resp. ≥) F (λP 1 + (1− λ)P 2).
entropy can be represented by taking η to be the identity
function, i.e., η(x) = x, and F (P ) = −
∑n
i=1 pi log(pi)
which is well known to be a symmetric concave function
over the space of probability distributions. Likewise, for l-
guess-error-probability as well as guesswork, η can be taken
as the identity function. For the conditional Rényi entropy
as per (2a), we can take η(x) = −1α−1 log(x) on R
+ and




i . For the conditional Rényi
entropy as in (2b), we can take η(x) = −αα−1 log(x) on
R+ and F (P ) = ‖P ‖α. For both cases, F is a symmetric
function that is non-decreasing in each element. Moreover,
when 0 ≤ α < 1, in both cases, η is increasing and F is
concave, and when α > 1, η is decreasing and F is convex.
As we argued before, the aim is to design channels that
have the lowest leakage of information about the secret while
satisfying a set of operational constraints, and the leakage
is defined as the difference between the posterior and prior
entropies. First point to note is that the choice of the channel
cannot change the prior entropy, as the prior entropy of the
secret is entirely governed by its prior distribution, which we
assume is a “given” parameter that the defender cannot control.
Therefore, the problem of minimizing the leakage becomes
equivalent to maximizing the posterior entropy (equivocation).
Before we express the general form of the optimal channel
design problem, we discuss an additional type of constraint
that may be relevant. There are many interesting cases where it
may be “feasible” to assign the same observable for all secrets,
but such a move may result in a huge deterioration in the
system’s quality of the service (QoS). In such cases, the goal
is to strike an optimal “balance” between information leakage
and QoS. This is for instance the setting in geo-location
privacy-utility trade-off [7]–[9] and secrecy-delay trade-off in
bucketing as a defence against timing attacks [2], [3].
In its most basic form, the QoS can be captured as an ex-
pected value of a “payoff” (desirability) function. In particular,
let u : S × O → R where u(s, o) represents how good the
realized observable is for a particular secret. Let ES,O[U ] be
the expected value of the pay-off, where the expectation is
taken with respect to the joint random variable of (S,O).
For conciseness, we drop the subscripts of S,O from the
expectation but in order to explicitly show the dependence








Eδ[U ] can be a metric for the QoS of the channel. The channel
design problem then becomes a “two-objective” optimization:
(a) minimizing leakage, and (b) maximizing the QoS. The so-
lution concept for multi-objective optimizations is of “Pareto-
efficiency” (Parto-optimality), which are the solutions with a
guarantee that no alternative can simultaneously improve all
of the objectives (at least one of them strictly). One of the
standard methods of converting a multi-objective optimization
(MOO) to (a series of) single-objective optimizations (SOO) is
to present all but one of the objectives as inequality constraints.
Specifically, we can introduce a lower threshold umin on the
QoS by imposing: Eδ[U ] ≥ umin. Then by varying the value of
umin and solving the resulting single-objective optimizations,
the Pareto-frontier (the set of Pareto-optimal solutions) will
be found (see e.g. [26]). Hence, with this in mind, for the
rest of the paper, we will be dealing with single-objective
optimizations. We will refer to the constraint of Eδ[U ] ≥ umin
as the “soft” constraint, since it is expressed in terms of the
expected-value, distinguishing it from the “hard” constraints
represented by Ω, which are per each realization of the secret.
Putting things together, the optimal channel design problem
in its most general form becomes:
max
δ ∈ R|S||O|










s′∈S ps′δ(o|s′) and P S|o is the |S|-sized
conditional probability vector whose entries are p(s | o) =
psδ(o|s)/(
∑
s′∈S ps′δ(o|s′)). The constraints of the optimiza-
tion are as follows:
δ(o|s) ≥ 0 ∀o ∈ O, s ∈ S (7a)∑
o∈O
δ(o|s) = 1 ∀s ∈ S (7b)
Eδ[U ] ≥ umin (7c)
δ(o|s) = 0 ∀(s, o) /∈ Ω (7d)
Before we get to our analysis, we present two minimalistic
examples to instantiate the constraints. We will return to these
examples in Sections IV, as they serve as a counter-example
for existence of a universally optimal channel. The first
toy example is motivated by geo-location privacy:3 Fig. 1
depicts 4 locations s1 to s4, where the configuration is a
representation of their relative positions. The defender is in
one of these 4 locations and generates an observable, which
can be its reported coordinates, based on which, it receives
a location-based service (LBS). Suppose in particular, that
s1 and s2 are near enough that the same observable can be
reported for both of them, but s1 is too far from s3 and s4
such that reporting the same coordinates with them is either
infeasible (e.g. it will then not get any network connectivity
from an access point) or it will be unacceptable (the quality
of the received utility will be too poor). Moreover, s2, s3
and s4 are close enough to produce the same observable. If
we label the observables simply by the subset of the secrets
that can produce them, then the set of admissible secret-
observable pairs, i.e., Ω, is
{
(s1, {s1}), (s2, {s2}), (s3, {s3}),
(s4, {s4}), (s1, {s1, s2}), (s2, {s1, s2}), (s2, {s2, s3}),
(s3, {s2, s3}), (s3, {s3, s4}), (s4, {s3, s4}), (s2, {s2, s3, s4}),
(s3, {s2, s3, s4}), (s4, {s2, s3, s4})
}
. This Ω determines
the hard constraints on the problem, e.g., we must have:
δ({s2, s3, s4}|s1) = 0 because (s1, {s2, s3, s4}) 6∈ Ω.
As another example, consider a minimalistic bucketing
example depicted in Fig. 2. The axis denotes time duration, and
s1 to s4 represent the distinct execution times of four distinct
3Note that each of these contexts of course have their idiosyncrasies that




Fig. 1. (Toy example 1) The “secret” is one of the four possible locations
s1 to s4. s1 is located too far away from s3 and s4 for all of the secrets
to be able to produce the same observable. To avoid clutter, only two of the
feasible observables, {s1, s2} and {s2, s3, s4} are demarcated here.
(encryption or decryption) processes, i.e., process 1 takes s1
time to finish, and so on. If the result of each process is
released immediately upon finishing, then they can be uniquely
identified just by the timing “side channel”. The result of a
finished process can be deferred and released at a later time, to
become identical to other processes that take longer to finish.
This superset duration time constitutes a bucket. In the figure,
the arrows represent whether a secret can be deferred till the
finishing time of a longer processes. Specifically, suppose that
the delay limitation for processes 1 does not allow it to be
released as late as s3 or s4. Therefore, the hard constraints
can be identically represented as in the previous toy example.
Duration
0 s1 s2 s3 s4
Fig. 2. (Toy example 2) The “secrets” are one of the four processes each
with a distinct execution time s1 to s4. The arrows denote which process can
be deferred to be released at a later finishing time. For instance, process 2
can be either release instantaneously, i.e., at s2, or deferred until s3, or until
s4. In contrast, s1 cannot be deferred as late as s3 or s4.
Before we present our technical results, we would also like
to point out that all of our results naturally extend to the case
of generalized gain-based entropies defined in [16] as well:








where G is a given |W| × |S| matrix with positive elements
where W is a bounded discrete set, and ‖ · ‖1 is the 1-norm
of a vector. When F is the ∞-norm, the interpretation of the
G(w, s) is that it is the gain of the adversary for choosing the
guess of w ∈ W when the actual secret is s ∈ S (this special
case is connected to g-leakage as described e.g. in [18]).
III. MINIMAL LEAKAGE IS CONVEX PROGRAMMING
Our first (and the most positive) proposition establishes that
for any choice of the entropy and payoff function, the problem
of finding an optimal channel is a “convex optimization” (a.k.a
“convex programming” [27], [28]). This is a useful result,
because convex optimizations have desirable characteristics,
e.g., many efficient algorithms for solving them exist (e.g.
interior methods [28]). Moreover, any local optimum has the
guarantee to also be a global optimum, so in particular any
“descent” algorithm will necessarily converge to a global
optimum. Additionally, in Proposition 2, we show that the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions fully describe the op-
timal channel (represent necessary and sufficient conditions
of optimality). Later, in Section IV, we demonstrate how this
can be used to establish non-trivial properties of the optimal
channels. Keep in mind that in our analytical parts, we assume
that the (conditional) entropy follows the generic form of (3)
where η and F satisfy the conditions described after (3).
Proposition 1: The optimization problem of (6) with con-
straints (7) for any choice of the pay-off and entropy functions
is a convex programming.4
Proof: First thing to note is that η from (6) can be simply
ignored for both cases, since it is a monotonic R → R
function. Now, suppose we are dealing with case-4a (the
argument for case-4b is identical). Our optimization variable
is δ ∈ R|S||O|. In particular, consider it as a |S||O| × 1
vector. All we need to show is that: (a) the constraints of the
optimization define a convex subset of R|S||O|; and (b) the
objective function of the maximization is concave in δ.
Establishing (a) is simple: the constraints (7a), (7b) and
(7d) trivially define a convex subset. The (7c), as is evident
from (5), is also a linear transformation of δ – where the
coefficient of δ(o|s) is psu(s, o). Hence, the constraints of the
problem define a convex subset of R|S||O|. In fact, they define
a bounded polyhedron, as the feasible set is the intersection
of half-spaces and it does not contain a whole line.
We establish part (b) by writing the objective function as
a composition of a series of transformation each of which
preserves convexity/concavity. First, note that the expression


















where (psδ(o|s))s∈S represent the |S|-sized vector, whose
entries are psδ(o|s). It is sufficient to show that each term
of the (outside) summation is a convex function in δ. Without
loss of generality, we show this for o1 ∈ O+:5
• Affine transformation 1: h1 : R|S||O| → R|S|, as h1(~y) =
A~y, where A is a |S| × |S||O| matrix whose entries are
as follows: A(i, i) = psi for i = 1, . . . , |S|, and zero
otherwise; Affine transformation is both a convex and a
concave function; The result of Aδ is the |S| × 1 vector
of (psδ(o1|s))s∈S .
• Composition with the concave function F . Recall that
by assumption F is non-decreasing in each element and
4Both minimizing a convex function and maximizing a concave function,
over a convex set, are instances of “convex” programming.
5Note that since F is bounded, we have: limp(o)→0 p(o)F (PS|o) = 0,
and hence we can only focus on o ∈ O+.
concave over probability distributions (case-4a). Compo-
sition of a concave function that is non-decreasing in
each element with a concave function yields a concave
function [27, Page 86].
• Affine transformation 2: consider the transformation h2 :
R|S| →: R|S|+1 as follows: h2(y) = (~y, ‖~y‖1). Note
that ‖~y‖1 is an linear transformation (simply, sum of
its elements). The h2 transformation is equivalent to
multiplication by the (|S|+ 1)× |S| matrix B, which is
composed of the |S| × |S| identity matrix with an extra
bottom row of “all ones”.
• Perspective: consider the perspective transformation h3 :
R|S|+1 → R|S| as follows: h3(y, t) = tF (y/t). Then, if
F is concave, so is h3 [27, Chapter 3.2.6].
Composition of these together gives us the first term of the
expression, establishing the proposition.
As mentioned before, a fundamental property of convex
optimizations is that any local optimum is a global optimum.
In what follows, we establish another important property
of the optimal channel design problems: that the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions provide both necessary and
sufficient conditions for optimality. We will showcase the use
of such conditions in Section IV, where we prove existence of
universal optimal channels for a special class of constraints.
For an overview of the Lagrangian duality and KKT conditions
the reader can consult with the rich literature on convex
programming such as [27, Ch.5] and [29, Ch.28].
Proposition 2: KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient
for finding the optimal channel design, described by (6), (7).
Proof: We start by noticing that in the most basic form,
KKT conditions are expressed for cases where the function in
the objective and constraints are “continuously differentiable”,
whereas some of our convex objective functions (e.g. in the
case of min-entropy or guesswork) are piecewise linear. There
is however a simple and standard translation from piecewise-
linear convex functions into continuously differentiable func-
tions by forming the epigraph problem [27, §5.2.5].
The proof is straightforward: all of our constraints (7) are
affine hence the KKT conditions are necessary – this is known
as “Linearity Constraint Qualification” (LCQ). Moreover,
since we showed that these problems are convex optimizations,
the KKT conditions are also sufficient [27, §5.5.3].
The “Lagrangian” for the problem of (6) with constraints





























where the multipliers µ, γ are from the equality constraints
(7b) and (7d), and are therefore free (no sign constraint),
whereas the multipliers λ, ρ pertain to inequalities (7a) and
(7c), and are hence required to be positive (dual feasibility).
The optimization problem then becomes equivalent to solv-
ing the following KKT conditions:
1) Vanishing first order derivatives of L with respect to each
of the optimization variables δ(o|s), that is, ∇L = ~0
(where ∇ is the gradient with respect to the (primal)
variables δ(o|s)). That is, for each δ(o|s): ∂L∂δ(o|s) = 0;
2) Primal feasibility: constraints (7a)–(7d);
3) Dual feasibility:λso ≥ 0, ∀s, o, and ρ ≥ 0;
4) Complementary slackness: ∀s, o λsoδ(o|s) = 0 and
ρ(
∑
s,o psδ(o|s)u(s, o)− umin) = 0.
IV. UNIVERSALITY (MEASURE-INVARIANCE) RESULTS
Although Proposition 1 holds for any choice of the entropy
and utility, it is a much weaker statement than the notion
of universality as measure-invariance optimality described in
[16]. In particular, they showed that for a special choice of
the constraints, there is a “universally optimal” randomized
channel, in the sense that, there exists a channel that is leakage-
optimal irrespective of the choice of the entropy. That is, all
of the optimizations share a common optimizer.
A. Universal (Measure-Invariant) Optimality
Here, we give an overview of the main results on universal
(measure-invariant) optimality proved in [16]. Informally, the
the result says that if the only constraint on the channel is that
at most k < |S| of secrets can produce the same observable,
then it is possible to design a channel which is universally
optimal. The design constraint can be expressed as follows:
the size of the pre-image of any observable must be at most
k. To design such channel one starts by sorting the prior in
descending order, and identifying an index j∗, which is the
index of the first “non-giant” secret, that is, the last secret with
a “too large” probability compared to the remaining secrets.
This way, the first j∗ − 1 secrets will constitute the “giants”.
More formally given a prior P = (p1, . . . , pn), sorted in
descending order and an integer k < n, let index j∗ be:
j∗ := min
{
j : 1 ≤ j ≤ k, pj ≤
∑n
i=j pi
k − j + 1
}
. (9)
With j∗ defined as above, let ~π denote the following proba-
bility distribution over k elements:
~π :=
(
p1, . . . , pj∗−1,
∑n
i=j∗ pi
k − j∗ + 1
, . . . ,
∑n
i=j∗ pi
k − j∗ + 1
)
(10)
i.e. ~π is a k-sized probability distribution whose first j∗ − 1
probabilities are the first j∗ − 1 probabilities of the prior (the
“giants”), and the remaining probabilities are mashed together
and spread “uniformly”. The universal optimality result in [16]
(re-phrased) is the following:
Theorem 1: Consider channels form secrets with a given
prior P = (p1, . . . , pn) to a set of observables, that satisfy
the constraint that at most k secrets can produce the same ob-
servable, i.e., that the size of the pre-image of any observable
is at most k, where k < n. Let ~π be defined as in (10). Then
the maximum posterior entropy achieved by any such channel
is H(~π) for any Schur-concave choice of entropy function H .
Moreover, if the only design constraint is the pre-image size
constraint, then there exists a channel that achieves a posterior
entropy exactly equal to H(~π) for any Schur-concave H , and
is hence universally (measure-invariantly) optimal.
Notice that ~π is independent from the choice of the entropy
H . Recall that since the prior distribution cannot be changed
in this setting, the posterior-entropy maximizing channel in
the theorem is also (measure-invariantly) leakage-optimal. The
proof in [16] is constructive, in that it provides the optimal
channel explicitly. The construction is non-trivial and is left
out for brevity. We just mention that the optimal channel is
constructed such as to guarantee that for any observable, the
posterior (Bayesian) probability over the secrets is exactly ~π.
For both of our toy examples in Figures 1 and 2, only the
first part of the theorem can be applied, i.e., the upper-bound
of the posterior entropy with k = 3. The second part of the
Theorem does not apply, because the design constraints in
nether of the toy examples can be reduced to just a pre-image
size constraint. Specifically, in both examples, there is only
one allowed pre-image of size 3, while all subset of size 3
of the four secrets should be allowed as a pre-image. Thus,
existence of a measure-invariant channel is not guaranteed.
The positive results in [16] raise a fundamental question:
does this strong notion of universality hold in general? Next,
as one of the main contributions of this paper, we settle this
question through a counter-example.
Proposition 3: In general, there is no universally optimal
channel, i.e., for a given prior and a set of design constraints,
there is no channel that minimizes the leakage for any choice
of how the leakage is measured.
In other words, in general, the problem of designing a
leakage minimal channel is sensitive to the choice of entropy,
i.e., the way leakage is quantified.
Proof: Consider the following example: There are 4 se-
crets: S = {1, 2, 3, 4} with prior P = (p1, p2, p3, p4). The set
of observables (outputs) is {a, b}. The set of feasible observ-
ables is defined by Ω = {(1, a), (2, a), (2, b), (3, b), (4, b)}.
That is, for secret 1, the only possible observable to show is
a, for secret 2, both a and b are allowed, and for secrets 3 and
4, the only allowed observable is b. There is no soft utility
constraint. Following the admissible observables for secrets
1, 3 and 4, we have: δ(b|1) = δ(a|3) = δ(a|4) = 0, and
therefore: δ(a|1) = δ(b|3) = δ(b|4) = 1. For secret 2, δ(a|2)
and δ(b|2) are free, as long as they are positive and add up to 1.
Therefore, δ(a|2) is the only variable of optimization. We will
therefore introduce the variable x defined as x := p2δ(b|2).
The probability that a is observed is: p(a) =
∑4
i=1 piδ(a|i),
which, following the previous argument, will reduce to: p1 +
p2 − x. Similarly, p(b) = x+ p3 + p4. Hence, the problem of
maximizing posterior entropy reduces to the following single-
variable optimization:
Maximize:(p1 + p2 − x)F ((
p1
p1 + p2 − x
,
p2 − x
p1 + p2 − x
))
(x+ p3 + p4)F ((
x
x+ p3 + p4
,
p3
x+ p3 + p4
,
p4
x+ p3 + p4
))
subject to: 0 ≤ x ≤ p2
For any (differentiable) choice of F , in the light of Propo-
sition 1, we can find the optimal solution by simply taking
the derivative of the objective function with respect to x and
equating it with zero. For the choice of F as per Shannon,
the optimizer is derived as: xSh =
p2(1− p1 − p2)
1− p2
And for
Rényi family with α = 2 – i.e., the collision entropy and the
form of the Rényi conditional entropy as in (2a), it is:
xR2 =
#








p21 (p3(p1 + p2 − 1) + (p1 + p2 − 1)2 + p23)
These two evaluate to different values for instance for the prior
of (0.2, 0.5, 0.15, 0.15). Specifically, xSh = 0.3 and xR2 =
0.265 (up to 3 digits). Figure 3 depicts the objective function
(posterior entropy) v.s. x for these two and some other choices
of the entropy function. The optimizer clearly varies with the
choice of F .















Fig. 3. Posterior entropy v.s. x for different choices of the entropy function
for the negative counter-example. The maximizer is for guesswork entropy
0.1518, for Rényi with α = 2 is 0.2573 , for Shannon entropy is 0.2998 and
for half-norm is 0.37493
The constraint in [16] that lead to universal optimality was
a cap on the size of the pre-images of the observables. This
constraints allows for a level of symmetric flexibility, e.g., any
pair of secrets can be conflated with each other, something
that our counter-examples do not allow. This leads to another
basic question: is the setting in [16] necessary for existence
of a universal solution? In what follows, we describe a class
of problems beyond the pre-image size-constraint of [16] and
establish that they still admit a universally optimal channel.
Consider an instance of our optimal channel design prob-
lem where the design constraints are expressed as a (non-
directional) graph, where the nodes of the graph are the
secrets, and the edges represent the observables. The two ends
of an edge determine the two secrets that can produce that
observable. One can also assume that each node has a “self-
loop” as well, in that, for each secret, there is always a choice
of producing a fully revealing observable. This setting means
that only (specific) “pairs” of secrets can conflate with each
other. Note that this is not a case of [16] with a pre-image size
of 2, since, unlike there, not all pairs of secrets are permissible.
For instance, if there are 4 secrets {1, 2, 3, 4}, the setting in
[16] with cap-size 2 required that all edges 1 ↔ 2, 1 ↔ 3,
1 ↔ 4, 2 ↔ 3, 2 ↔ 4, and 3 ↔ 4 (besides the self-loops)
should be present, in contrast, we can now have an arbitrary
subset of these be allowed, for example 1↔ 2, 2↔ 3, 2↔ 4,
and 3 ↔ 4 (besides the self-loops). Critically, “symmetry” is
now broken. We will refer to this class of optimal channel
design problems, where there is no soft constraint, and the
hard constraints are expressible by such a graph, as graph-
constrained. Note that in the absence of a soft constraint, and
the assumption that a fully-revealing observable for each secret
is always possible, the problem is always “feasible”.
In our general optimal channel design problem in Section II,
we designated the set of admissible secret-observable pairs by
Ω. Let us translate the above graph-based representation of the
constraints with respect to Ω. For an observable o ∈ O, let
the notation o−1 represent the set of secrets that are allowed
to produce o, that is, o−1 := {s ∈ S, (s, o) ∈ Ω}. Then our
positive result applies to any case where ∀o ∈ O, we have:
|o−1| ≤ 2.
Proposition 4: Any “graph-constrained” optimal channel
design problem admits a universally optimal solution.
Proof: We present the proof in the following steps: First,
we take the entropy to be the special case of Shannon, and
investigate its optimal solution (whose existence is guaran-
teed). In particular, we investigate its KKT conditions as
“necessary” conditions of optimality. Next, we show that these
KKT conditions are sufficient to satisfy the KKT conditions
of any other entropy as well. By the “sufficiency” of KKT,
this establishes that a Shannon-optimal channel is also optimal
for any choice of entropy as well. Keep in mind that in
Proposition 2, we showed that the KKT conditions are both
necessary and sufficient for optimality of a channel.
Let us start with the first-order conditions of KKT. Taking
the partial derivative of the Lagrangian in (8) with respect
to δ(o1|s1) for a (s1, o1) ∈ Ω, after removing the cancelling




) + µs1 + λ
s1
o1 = 0 (11)
which can be written simply as −ps1 log(p(s1|o1)) + µs1 +
λs1o1 = 0. Also, the complementary slackness condition states
that λsoδ(o|s) = 0 ∀s ∈ S, o ∈ O. This in turn implies that,
if for a (s1, o1) ∈ Ω, we have δ(o1|s1) > 0, i.e., the channel
assigns a strictly positive probability to observable o1 when the
secret is s1, then we must necessarily have λs1o1 = 0. Therefore,
for such (s1, o1), the first order condition further simplifies to:
−ps1 log(p(s1|o1)) + µs1 = 0
In particular, if there are o1, o2 ∈ O for which both δ(o1|s1) >
0 and δ(o2|s1) > 0 (same s1), we must have: log(p(s1|o1)) =
log(p(s1|o2)) = µs1/ps1 . Since log(x), x > 0, is a strictly
increasing function, the above equality is satisfied only when:
p(s1|o1) = p(s1|o2).
and since the support of the posterior entropies is at most 2,
this further implies that P S|o1 = P S|o2 .
Now, consider any other entropy. That is, in the Lagrangian
(8), F is a generic concave symmetric function. Keep the same
optimal channel δ, and the same Lagrange multipliers λso and
γso (s ∈ S, o ∈ O) as per Shannon’s (that is, take all of the
Lagrange multipliers except for µs, s ∈ S) but potentially
different values for µs (which we designate by µ′s). The primal
feasibility is still satisfied for the new entropy, as the choice
of entropy does not affect feasibility of the channel. The dual
feasibility as well as complementary slackness constraints are
also satisfied, as the same λso and δ(o|s) are carried forward.
Hence, the only condition that we need to investigate is the
vanishing of the first-order derivatives. In particular, we need
to see whether whenever δs1o1 > 0, we can have: ∂L/∂δ
s1
o1 +











where Fi is the partial derivative of F with respect to its i’th
element. If we define ϕ(P S|o1) := F (P S|o1)+F1(P S|o1)(1−
p(s1|o1))−
∑
i 6=1 Fi(P S|o1)p(si|o1), then the first order con-
dition can be simply written as p(s1)ϕ(P S|o1) + µ
′
s1 = 0.
Recall that there is no constraint (e.g. dual feasibility or
complementary slackness) on µ′s (it is a “free” variable).
Taking µ′s1 = −p(s1)ϕ(P S|o1) will satisfy the first-order-
condition for F for channel δ, since δ satisfies P S|o1 = P S|o2
for all o2 such that δ(o2|s1) > 0, and hence, p(s1)ϕ(P S|o1) =
p(s1)ϕ(P S|o2), and therefore, the same µ
′
s1 will satisfy the
first order condition with respect to δ(o2|s1) as well. Putting
things together, we have found Lagrange multipliers that
satisfy the KKT conditions corresponding to F , for the optimal
channel corresponding to Shannon, hence, the optimal channel
with respect to Shannon is also optimal for F as well (thanks
to “sufficiency” of KKT).
V. UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE PRIOR
So far, we assumed the adversary knows the exact prior
distribution of the secret. But this may be an unrealistic
assumption for some settings. Here, we analyze the setting
where the adversary does not know the exact distribution of
the prior, but knows that the prior distribution can be one
of a number of possibilities, each happening with a known
probability (a distribution over distributions6).
6The adversary’s uncertainty should not be seen here as a subjective belief
but as a genuine reflection about the possible state of the system.
At a high level, the main result of this section is the follow-
ing: the best strategy for the defender is not to “customize” its
strategy with respect to the context depending on the particular
prior given each context, but instead, to build an “averaged
prior”, and design the best strategy over this averaged prior
and play it irrespective of the contexts. In particular, whenever
the constraints are “full cloaking” constraints as in [16], then
there exists a universally optimal strategy δ̄.
This result may not be immediately intuitive, as there can
be a counter-argument as follows: Among the available priors
(conditional probability of the secret given the contexts), there
are some particularly “good” ones, in the sense that they are
very conducive to hide the secret (e.g. they are very close to
uniform in a symmetric constraint setting). Then shouldn’t we
adopt the optimal channel for such priors in those contexts,
specially, if they have a high probability weight of occurrence?
Our result refutes this intuitive argument.
To formalize the setting: the adversary’s uncertainty can
be modelled by introducing the “hidden” (discrete) random
variable for the context, C, that is jointly distributed with
the secret. The space of the context is C = {c1, . . . , c|C|}.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the context has full
support. The channel designer (the defender), knows the true
distribution of the secret. Technically speaking, it “observes”
the realization of the context. The adversary, on the other
hand, does not directly observe the context, but knows the
probability of the realization of each context, PC , as well as
the (conditional) probability distribution of the secret given
each context, P S|C . Note that knowledge of PC and P S|C
is equivalent to the knowledge of the “joint” probability
distribution of the context and the secret P S,C .
The adversary only sees the observables and wants to
“infer” about the underlying secret. As before, let O denote
the (discrete) random variable representing the observable
(output). In worst case, one can assume that the adversary
knows PO|S,C , and hence, using his knowledge of P S,C can
use the Bayes’ rule to update his best belief about the secret
after observing O, i.e., constructing his posterior:









Note that the defender is not directly interested in not
leaking information about the context and only cares about
the secret, but should be wary of how the adversary can use
his information about the joint distribution of the context and
secret to intuit about the secret based on the observation. Also,
for clarity, we repeat that the adversary does not “observe” the
context nor the secret.7
The defender decides what observable to produce per each
secret in each context, potentially using randomization and
benefit from the ambiguity that it can inject. As before, the
strategy has to satisfy some operational constraints. We may
have hard constraints prescribing which secrets can produce
7For the scenario where the adversary can directly observe the context,
the problem will reduce to designing |C| optimal channels according to
optimizations as in (6) and (7) with priors PS|c for each c ∈ C.
which observables, which in part determine which subsets
of secrets can be conflated with each other. In the previous
sections, we expressed these “hard” operational constraints
through Ω ⊆ S×O, representing the set of permissible secret-
observable pairs. In the presence of contexts, in the most
general form, the permissible observables for a secret may
depend on the context as well, and hence Ω should be now a
subset of S × C × O. However, for the result of this section,
we assume that these constraints are context-independent, i.e.,
the same subset of observables is permissible for a secret
irrespective of the context, and hence, we keep Ω to be a
subset of S ×O.
Likewise, there can be soft operational constraints in the
form of satisfying a minimum expected utility, as in (7c). The
expectation is now taken with respect to the context as well,
that is, we must have: ES,C,O[U ] ≥ umin. However, for the
result of this section, we assume that the payoff function, i.e.,
the measure of “goodness” of each observable for each secret,




p(s, c)δ(o|s, c)u(s, o)
As before, without loss of generality, assume that we are
dealing with case (4a) where F is concave and η is increasing.
Also note that, again, the choice of the strategy cannot affect
the prior entropy of the secret. Hence, the problem of design-
ing for minimum leakage is again equivalent to maximizing
the posterior entropy. Ignoring η, since it is just an increasing
scalar function, the posterior maximization objective in (6) can

























s∈S we mean the |S|-sized vector
whose entry for s ∈ S is p(s, c)δ(o|s, c). The constraint of the
optimization are (compare with (7)):
δ(o|s, c) ≥ 0 ∀o ∈ O, (s, c) ∈ S × C (13a)∑
o∈O
δ(o|s, c) = 1 ∀(s, c) ∈ S × C (13b)
ES,C,O[U ] ≥ umin (13c)
δ(o|s, c) = 0 ∀(s, o) /∈ Ω (13d)
Given any “context-dependent” strategy δ, we define a





To be precise, the strategy is δ̃ such that for any c′ ∈ C,
δ̃(o|s, c′) = δ̄(o|s), i.e., δ̃ represents playing the same ran-
domized strategy of δ̄ irrespective of the context. This context-
free strategy is a mixing of the context-dependent strategies
with weights equal to conditional probability of the context
given the secret. In other words, δ̃ “marginalizes away” the
dependence of δ on the context.8
First, we show that δ̃ is itself a legitimate strategy:
1) δ̃(o|s, c) ≥ 0: trivially (product of non negative terms);
2) ∀(s, c) ∈ S × C :
∑


















where we first exchanged the order of the summations,
and then respectively used the facts that δ(o|s, c′) and
p(c′|s) are conditional distributions.
3) We show that Eδ̃[U ] = Eδ[U ], and hence Eδ[U ] ≥ umin
would imply Eδ̃[U ] ≥ umin. For this purpose, we estab-
lish the following lemma, which we will user later:
Lemma 1: δ and δ̃ induce the same (joint) distribution on












p(c|s)δ̃(o|s, c) = pδ̃(s, o)
Now, Eδ̃[U ] = Eδ[U ] follows as a simple corollary:
Eδ(U) = Eδ(Eδ(U |S,O)) = Eδ(Eδ̃(U |S,O))
= Eδ̃(Eδ̃(U |S,O)) = Eδ̃(U)
The second equality holds because U is invariant with
respect to C, and the third equality is due to Lemma 1.
The first and last equality is simply the total expectation.
4) δ̃(o|s, c) = 0 ∀(o, s) /∈ Ωs, trivially. Note that we the
assumption that the cloaking constraints do not depend
on the context, and only on the secret.
Next, we show that replacing any context dependent strategy
with its context-independent would lead to same leakage
(irrespective of the choice of the entropy).
Proposition 5: For any given strategy δ, we have:
Hδ(S|O) = Hδ̃(S|O).
Proof: This is a direct consequence of Lemma 1, once
we notice that H(S|O) is totally determined by P S,O.
Our main result of this section:
Proposition 6: The optimization in (12) subject to con-








, δ̄ ∈ R|S||O| (15)
8Note that we cannot marginalize away the dependence on the secret be-
cause of the secret-dependent constraints. These secret dependent constraints
are exactly why the trivial solutions like δ(o | s, c) = cte. are not acceptable.
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Fig. 4. Comparing the Shannon’s posterior entropy between the optimal
design as per Proposition 6 and the heuristic best alternative, where the best
channel for each prior is designed and played according to the context. The pri-
ors are: P1 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (the “good” prior) and P2 = (0.8, 0.15, 0.05)
(the “bad” prior). The x-axis is the probability (weight) of P1. As we can
see, except trivially for the two end-points, the optimal strictly outperforms
this “best” heuristic. The cloak size is 2.
where p(o) =
∑




′)δ̄(o|s′)). The new constraints are:
δ̄(o|s) ≥ 0 ∀o ∈ O, s ∈ S (16a)∑
o∈O
δ̄(o|s) = 1 ∀s ∈ S (16b)
Eδ̄[U ] ≥ umin (16c)
δ̄(o|s) = 0 ∀(s, o) /∈ Ω (16d)
Notice that by proposition 6 the optimization problem over
a set of priors reduces to an optimization over a single prior,
hence whenever the constraints are “full cloaking” constraints
then Algorithm 1 from [16] provides a universal optimizer for
this uncertainty setting.
Discussion: As we mentioned in the beginning of this
section, an alternative heuristic is to play the best channel per
each context. One can argue that if the “good” priors that lead
to a particularly strong channel have a high probability, it may
be better to play this heuristic. However, as we established
in proposition 6, this heuristic is wrong. For a numerical
depiction, in Fig 4, we have plotted the posterior entropy
that is achieved by the optimal strategy δ̄ per proposition 6
against this heuristic strategy of playing the best channel per
each prior. As we can see, for any weight of the two priors
(except trivially when the weight is either 0 or 1 where the
two strategies become the same), the δ̄ strictly outperforms
the heuristic strategy.
VI. CASE STUDY: OPTIMAL DEFENCE AGAINST TIMING
LEAKAGE
As we mention in the introduction, there are many settings
in which, an adversary can gain unintended information just
by observing the execution time of a process. This is e.g. one
of the side-channel sources considered in [30], [31] where
they show secrets like the illnesses, medications or surgeries
of the user in healthcare context, her family income and
investments in the context of taxation can be revealed by
analysing encrypted traffic despite the HTTPS protection. This
section explores an application of our framework in the context
of defence against timing as side channel leakage.
The timing leakage can be completely eliminated by de-
laying release of computation results to the maximal possible
computation time for that set of possible computations. That is,
if all computations take the same time (as the maximum pos-
sible time), then the attacker cannot make any time inference
on which computation took place. Delaying all computations
to this extreme upper bound may however be practically
undesirable, as the performance degradation can be too high.
To combat this delay overhead, inspired by the “bucketing”
scheme in cryptography [2], [3], [22], [23], several interme-
diate epochs between the minimum and the maximum com-
putation time can be considered. Each of these intermediate
epochs will represent a “bucket”. Each computation can be
then delayed up to a later epoch before being released. A
simple argument can be made that the release epochs (buckets)
should be chosen among the computation times, as there is
no point in having a release epoch that falls in between two
consecutive computation times (the slower ones cannot be
part of the bucket, and the faster ones should not be delayed
pointlessly). However, the choice of the number of buckets,
their epochs, and process-bucket assignments are non-trivial.
Trade-offs between number of buckets and performance for
a cryptographic system with deterministic timing behaviour
have been formally investigated by Köpf and Dürmuth in [2].
In particular, they show that in the context of RSA, using
five buckets, it is still possible to have a minimal penalty
in performance (less than 1% time delay) while significantly
weakening timing-channel information leakage.
Here, we consider a different (simpler) setup: while in [2]
the secret is the cryptographic key which has correlation with
the processing time, we consider the (un-delayed) finishing
time itself to be the secret. In other words, we would like
to hide from the adversary which process has taken place.
We formulate our “randomized bucketing” to give the opti-
mal trade-off between leakage and delay. We compare our
randomized bucketing with a heuristic scheme, which we
call “deterministic bucketing”, where each process is delayed
up to its nearest available release time (bucket), where the
number of buckets and their epochs are optimized. Note that
our “randomized bucketing” offers more degrees of freedom
compared to “deterministic bucketing” in that the release times
of a process can be any of the future epochs according to
the probability distribution that we design. In particular, any
deterministic bucketing scheme is a special case of randomized
bucketing too: one in which the entire probability is put on
the next immediate available epoch.
In the formal analysis below, leakage will be measured in
term of min-entropy, i.e. in terms of the probability of correctly
guessing the secret in one try. Both bucketing strategies will
be analysed as optimization problems, in particular as multi-
objective optimizations aiming at minimizing both leakage
and delay overhead. The problem is set in general terms, in
particular the optimal number of buckets and their locations
are determined by the optimization itself.
Let us denote the probability that the bucketing strategy
sends secret i to bucket j by δ(j|i). We have given our
randomized bucketing as a Linear-Programming in Fig 5. The











(this is expressed by combining
∑N
j=1 zj and zj ≥
piδ(j|i), i ≤ j, j ≤ N in Fig 5). For each
bucket j, maxi≤j≤N piδ(j|i)/pj is the highest probabil-
ity of guessing the secret under δ, hence minimizing∑N
j=1 maxi≤j≤N piδ(j|i) is minimizing the expected prob-
ability of guessing the secret (in one guess) given the strategy





i=1 piδ(j|i)(Tj−Ti) ≤ ε. The term∑N
j=1
∑j
i=1 piδ(j|i)(Tj − Ti) is the expected delay, summed
over each bucket (inner summation) and over all buckets (outer
summation). This expected delay is imposed to be below ε. As
ε varies the optimization solutions will build the Pareto front.
Our implementation of the optimization of the deterministic
bucketing is presented in Fig 6 as a linear integer program-
ming. Here, as the strategy is deterministic, it can only take
values 0 or 1, hence the constraints δ(j|i) ∈ {0, 1} for
i ≤ j ≤ N . The constraint that each secret is mapped to its
closest bucket is enforced by δ(j|k) ≥ δ(j|i), i ≤ k ≤ j ≤ N .
To see this, suppose δ(j|i) = 1, i.e., the strategy assigns i to
bucket j. Then the constraint requires any secret k between i
and j to satisfy δ(j|k) = 1, i.e., k must be assigned to bucket
j too. Finally the expression of the minimum delay constraint
is the same as in randomized bucketing.
As we mentioned, a deterministic bucketing strategy is
also a randomized bucketing strategy, hence a solution to the
randomized bucketing optimization will always outperform
a solution of the standard bucketing optimization under the
same delay constraints. What is remarkable is that the gain
in performance can be significant. For instance, randomized
bucketing can achieve zero min-entropy leakage under the
same delay constraints whereas deterministic bucketing can-
not. We will illustrate this through a toy example. Suppose
there are three secrets {0, 1, 2} with the prior (1/2, 1/3, 1/6)
and execution times 1, 2, 3. The Pareto-front solutions from
the two optimizations are depicted in Fig 7. In particular, the
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Therefore, the adversary would have guessed the secret in one
try with the same probability of success using the prior or the
posterior, i.e., there is no min-entropy leakage.








3 . However the
delay at which deterministic bucketing achieve zero leakage is




3 , which is the trivial solution of having a single
bucket at the maximum time. Both of these points are visible





s. t.: δ(j|i) ≥ 0, i ≤ j, j ≤ N
N∑
j=1
δ(j|i) = 1, i ≤ N





piδ(j|i)(Tj − Ti) ≤ ε





s. t.: δ(j|i) ∈ {0, 1}, i ≤ j, j ≤ N
N∑
j=1
δ(j|i) = 1, i ≤ N
δ(j|k) ≥ δ(j|i) i ≤ j, j ≤ N
i ≤ k ≤ j





piδ(j|i)(Tj − Ti) ≤ ε
Fig. 6. Optimization for Standard bucketing (ILP).
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented some new advances in designing robust
minimal leakage channels. We established the existence of
universally optimal channels for a new class of constraints.
The question of the extent of existence of universal (measure-
invariant) optimality is still an open problem. We expect more




















Fig. 7. Comparison between deterministic bucketing (dashed line) and ran-
domized bucketing. The randomized bucketing outperforms the deterministic
bucketing with respect to both of the (leakage/utility) objectives. Notably,
randomized bucketing can achieve zero min-entropy leakage non-trivially
(with average delay of 2/3) as opposed to the trivial solution of deterministic
bucketing of having a single bucket at the end (average delay of 4/3).
generalized classes of channel design problems that admit
a universal (measure-invariant) solution exist. Finding other
sufficient and/or necessary conditions for universal (measure-
invariant) optimality will be among our future steps. We
expect that our foundational results, for instance, the universal
convexity of the problem and necessity and sufficiency of
KKT conditions would provide the tools to explore this open
problem. The bucketing application makes a strong case for
randomized channel design. A priority of our further work
would be to look into other potential applications and imple-
mentations taking into account their nuances.
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